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Infectious diseases can constitute public health emergencies of international concern when a pathogen arises,
acquires new characteristics, or is deliberately released, leading to the potential for loss of human lives as well
as societal disruption. Awide range of risk drivers are now known to lead to and/or exacerbate the emergence
and spread of infectious disease, including global trade and travel, the overuse of antibiotics, intensive
agriculture, climate change, high population densities, and inadequate infrastructures, such as water treatment
facilities. Where multiple risk drivers interact, the potential impact of a disease outbreak is amplified. The
varying temporal and geographic frequency with which infectious disease events occur adds yet another layer
of complexity to the issue. Mitigating the emergence and spread of infectious disease necessitates mapping and
prioritising the interdependencies between public health and other sectors. Conversely, during an international
public health emergency, significant disruption occurs not only to healthcare systems but also to a potentially
wide range of sectors, including trade, tourism, energy, civil protection, transport, agriculture, and so on. At
the same time, dealing with a disease outbreak may require a range of critical sectors for support. There is a
need to move beyond narrow models of risk to better account for the interdependencies between health and
other sectors so as to be able to better mitigate and respond to the risks posed by emerging infectious disease.
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T
he Ebola outbreak of 2014 has demonstrated very
clearly the vast harm that infectious diseases can
cause when combined with other exacerbating
factors.Poorhealthsystems,aslowinternationalresponse,
low public trust in government and medicine in the out-
break area, the introduction of the virus to urban settings,
and social practices such as burial rites that increase the
risk of contagion have created a ‘perfect storm’ for Ebola
transmission (1). The gravity of the Ebola outbreak is de-
monstrated by thousands of deaths,
1 and by the potential
for further spread. The interconnected and cross-border
nature of the threat has facilitated Ebola transmission in
West Africa, and it has also led to cases appearing in both
the United States and continental Europe.
As the global community mobilises in response to
Ebola, it is clear that there is a need to better acknowledge
that the spread of infectious diseases is related to the
circumstances in which human society is organised. This
has long been the case; human interactions with animal
hosts have led to infectious disease outbreaks dating at
least as far back as the Justinian Plague (541542 AD),
while global trade and travel have facilitated disease
transmission, from the plague in the 14th century, small-
pox in the 16th century, to SARS or a novel influenza
virus in the 21st century (24). Indeed, it is often noted
that in today’s interconnected world, a disease can spread
nearly anywhere on Earth within 24 hours. But infectious
disease risks are not simply a by-product of globalisation.
As Ebola demonstrates, a great many factors, some not
restricted to the disease control or public health arena,
can influence the spread of infectious disease. Assessing
disease-related health risks thus necessitates understand-
ing where they might arise and how successful it might be
in transmitting. The largest risks tend to occur when novel
diseases appear, when familiar diseases appear in novel
1http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/135765/1/roadmapupdate3oct14_
eng.pdf?ua=1, accessed October 7, 2014.
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trol measures break down, whether due to socioeconomic
inequalities, lack of resources, accident, or conflict.
Despite this, the interconnections and interdependen-
cies that create (and are created by) emerging infectious
diseases tend to be downplayed, to the detriment of public
health. In order to address the topic, this paper provides
disparate examples of infectious disease outbreaks, with
the common theme being the many factors that combined
to worsen the situation. ‘Infectious disease drivers and
interconnected risk’ section will discuss the types of fac-
tors that can influence the spread of infectious disease.
‘Examples of interconnections and interdependencies in
recent infectious disease events’ section will provide some
examples of recent infectious disease incidents that have
been created by the interconnectedness of factors intro-
duced in the ‘Infectious disease drivers and intercon-
nected risk’section. These examples are primarily focused
on the European Union (EU), the area in which the authors
are based, but the global linkages have been emphasised.
‘Analysing interconnected and interdependent infectious
disease risks’ section will discuss some of the integrated
risk modelling approaches that have been developed in an
attempt to monitor and even predict infectious disease
transmission, and the ‘Conclusion’section will summarise
this paper by reiterating the need for and importance of
recognising the interconnected and interdependent nature
of infectious disease risks.
Infectious disease drivers and
interconnected risk
The concept of interconnected risks refers to the idea
thatseeminglydisconnectedrisksareintrinsicallylinkedto
one another (5). In health, the concept of interconnected
risk helps draw attention to the fact that factors tradition-
ally viewed of as ‘external’ to health can nonetheless drive
health risks. Emerging infectious diseases, for example,
can easily be viewed as interconnected because they are
affected by a wide range of ecological, political, and so-
cioeconomic ‘drivers’ (68). They can also be viewed as
interdependent because of their transboundary nature,
and because risks from other sectors can interact synergis-
tically or antagonistically. In short, the emergence of
an infectious disease risk can amplify and be amplified
by risks from other sectors. These could include employee
absenteeism andworkforce shortages, potential social dis-
cord, or severe disruptions in energy, healthcare delivery,
transportation, or other critical sectors (9, 10).
There are many different ways in which the myriad
factors that influence infectious disease could be cate-
gorised. For the sake of simplicity, the remainder of this
discussion is derived from a study which grouped them
according to three broad (and somewhat simplistic) cate-
gories:globalisationandenvironmentalchange;socialand
demographic factors; and health and food production (7).
It should be noted that although in the following sections
each set of factors will be discussed individually, they are
themselves often interconnected, adding an additional
layerofcomplexitytotheissue.Furthermore,theexamples
provided below are merely indicative and not exhaustive.
Globalisation and environmental change
Awide range of infectious disease drivers can be grouped
under this category, including climate change, land-use
patterns, global trade and travel, migration, and so on.
Climate change involves mean temperature increases in
many parts of the world, as well as increased likelihood of
adverse or even extreme weather events (1113). Many
infectious diseases are temperature sensitive as many
vectors and pathogens are dependent upon permissive
ambient conditions. There is thus a substantial body of
research that collectively demonstrates that warming will
increase the transmission of vector-borne diseases in the
geographic ranges of their distribution (1418). Changing
temperature and precipitation patterns can affect the
habitats and population growth of cold-blooded disease
vectors, such as mosquitoes and ticks, as well as the
replication rates of infectious diseases within their hosts,
and even the rates at which disease-carrying vectors bite
humans (1820).
Amongthebestsubstantiatedindicatorsoftheobserved
effects of climate change on infectious disease is evidence
of an altitudinal increase of malaria in the highlands of
Columbia and Ethiopia (21) and of the northerly expan-
sionofthedisease-transmittingtickspecies,Ixodesricinus,
inSweden(22).Manymodellingstudiesprojectsignificant
shifts in the transmission of vector-borne diseases such as
malaria(23,24),dengue(25),andChikungunya(26)under
climate change scenarios, but it is important to note that
theextentofobservedchangeswilldepend onthepresence
orabsenceofmitigatingmeasures,suchasvectorcontrolor
socioeconomic development (27, 28). Other examples
of infectious diseases in Europe anticipated to be affected
by climate change include West Nile virus (29), salmonella
(30), campylobacter, and cryptosporidium (31, 32).
Land-use patterns, meanwhile, are a crucial driver of
infectious disease emergence. It has been estimated that
more than 60% of human pathogens are zoonotic (i.e.
diseases of animals that can be transmitted to humans) (33).
Many human land-use activities, including agriculture, ir-
rigation, hunting, deforestation, and urban expansion,
can cause or increase the risk of zoonotic and food- and
water-borne diseases (33, 34). For example, one conse-
quence of urban sprawl and deforestation is that wildlife
may increasingly need to find new habitats in urban or
abandoned environments, which could lead to increased
human exposures to infectious pathogens. Meanwhile, the
density of human population, also associated with in-
creasing urbanisation, has also been shown to be linked
to the emergence of many infectious diseases (35).
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migration, render political borders irrelevant and create
further possibilities for global disease transmission (3638).
There are numerous examples of the arrival, establishment,
and spread of ‘exotic’ pathogens to new geographic loca-
tions, including malaria, dengue, Chikungunya, West Nile,
and bluetongue in recent years, aided by shipping or other
trade routes (36). This process is facilitated when the en-
vironmental conditions in different parts of the world share
common characteristics (36). Meanwhile, numerous vaccine-
preventable diseases, such as polio, meningitis or measles,
can also be introduced or reintroduced to susceptible pop-
ulations as a consequence of international travel (39).
Social and demographic factors
Social and demographic contexts can significantly influ-
ence the transmission of infectious disease, while also
creating increased vulnerabilities for some population
subgroups. The elderly are at greater risk of many in-
fectious diseases, and the ageing trend in many high-
income countries could increase the challenges related
to nosocomial (hospital-acquired) and nursing-home
acquired infections. An additional challenge related to
population ageing is that the share of employed workers
in a country decreases. The combination of more people
to care for and fewer tax-related revenues may chal-
lenge publicly financed public health and disease control
programmes (7).
When persons from regions with high endemicity of a
given disease move to ones with lower endemicity, new
challenges for public health are created. In addition
migrant communities can be highly vulnerable to certain
infectious diseases. In the EU, for example, approximately
37% of HIV cases reported in 2011 were among people
born abroad, and the equivalent number of cases for
tuberculosis was 25% (40). Similarly, migrants suffer from
a higher burden of chronic hepatitis B infections (41).
It is widely established that socially and economically
disadvantaged groups suffer disproportionally from dis-
ease (42). This is applicable to infectious disease burdens
in both high- and low-income settings (43, 44). Income
inequalities are generally widening globally, and this ap-
pearstobehavebeenexacerbatedinmanycountriesdueto
the global economic crisis (45). Rising unemployment and
the prospect of public health budget cuts can increase the
risk of infectious disease transmission (44, 46), with a
prominent example being an outbreak of HIV among
people who inject drugs (PWID) in Greece (see ‘Measles
among Roma in Bulgaria and HIV among PWID in
Greece: the impact of socioeconomic contexts’ section)
(47, 48). In a similar fashion, it has been speculated that
tuberculosis rates could rise in some countries in Central
and Eastern Europe (49).
Social trends and behaviours can also play a significant
role in infectious disease transmission. The most notable
example would be vaccine hesitancy, the phenomenon
through which vaccination coverage rates remain sub-
optimal due to the varying and complicated reasons that
individuals may have for not getting vaccinated (50, 51).
In some cases, this might be related to misconceptions
about the safety or efficacy of vaccines (50, 52), whereas
in others this may be related to religious or cultural
beliefs (53).
Health and food production
The financing, provision, and quality of healthcare sys-
tems;theavailabilityofvaccines,antivirals,andantibiotics
medicines, and appropriate compliance to treatment pro-
tocols are all important determinants of infectious disease
transmission. Although the correlation between health-
care system financing and efficacy is not perfect, recent
budget cuts to healthcare are an important consideration
when anticipating infectious disease risk. In part related
to the global economic crisis, it has been reported that
many high-income governments have introduced policies
to lower spending through cutting the prices of medical
productsand,forexample,throughbudgetrestrictionsand
wage cuts in hospitals (54). There are many indirect and
direct pathways through which budget cuts could affect
disease transmission; to provide just one example, it has
been estimated that 2030% of healthcare-associated
infections are preventable with intensive hygiene and
control programmes
2  should investments in this area
diminish, then healthcare-acquired infections could be-
come an even more problematic issue. There are currently
roughly 4.1 million healthcare-associated infections each
year in the EU alone.
3
A broader issue related to healthcare provision is pop-
ulation mobility for both healthcare professionals and
patients who might increasingly seek work or healthcare
in other countries  the provision of cross-border health-
care and the mitigation of cross-border health threats
will necessitate collaboration across borders (55, 56) and
solutions for the brain-drain of medical personnel from
resource-poor countries (57). Also related to the health-
care provision and practice is the over-prescription or
overuse of antibiotics. In combination with a lag in phar-
maceutical innovation, rapid transmission, and poor
infection control measures, this has driven resistance of
organisms such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus, or extended-spectrum beta-lactamases, and car-
bapenemase-producing gram-negatives such as Klebsiella
pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) (58). Antimicrobial
resistance is currently one of the major health risks facing
society (59).
2http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Healthcare-associated_infections/
Pages/index.aspx, accessed January 14, 2014.
3http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Healthcare-associated_infections/
Pages/index.aspx, accessed January 14, 2014.
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for human infectious diseases. Attempts are underway to
estimate the global burden of food-borne disease (60),
which is likely substantial. Many factors in food produc-
tion affect human health. Avast range of familiar human
pathogens can be acquired through the consumption of
animal products and other disease drivers, such as global
travel, further provoke this (61). In addition to farmed
animals, the hunting and slaughtering of wild animals has
led to the emergence of more exotic pathogens: SARS
originated in wildlife markets and restaurants in southern
China (62) and HIV and Ebola have both been linked
to the hunting or slaughtering of primates and other wild
animals (33, 63, 64). The density and health of livestock,
meanwhile, havebeen linked todisease in humans (65, 66).
Although inconclusive, there is some evidence to suggest
that livestock production may lead to increased antibiotic
resistance in human pathogens. There are certainly many
pathways by which drug resistant pathogens could trans-
mit from livestock to humans, including environmental con-
tamination by excreted veterinary antibiotics (33, 67, 68).
Examples of interconnections and
interdependencies in recent infectious
disease events
It is noteworthy that many of the disease drivers discussed
above are, from the perspective of other sectors, risks in
their own rights. The World Economic Forum’s Global
Risks Report 2013 identified two infectious disease-
specific risks, vulnerability to pandemics and antibiotic-
resistant bacteria (highlighting the latter) (69). Even more
noteworthy, apropos the discussion from ‘Infectious dis-
ease drivers and interconnected risk’ section, many of the
risks identified in that report are themselves exacerbat-
ing factors for the spread of infectious disease. These
include: major systemic financial failure; failure of climate
change adaptation; severe income disparity; mismanage-
ment of population ageing; terrorism; land and water-
way use mismanagement; mismanaged urbanisation; and
species overexploitation (69).
It is instructive to provide a few examples of how such
risks are interconnected in the context of infectious dis-
ease. Literally, hundreds of examples from around the
world could have been selected. One study identified 335
events leading to an emerging infectious disease between
1940 and 2004, identifying numerous infectious disease
‘hotspots’ across the globe  areas in which a dispropor-
tionately high number of disease emergencies have con-
centrated (35). Western Europe is identified as one such
hotspot, and as the region with which the authors of
this chapter are most familiar, the examples below will
be slightly biased towards Europe. Nonetheless, while
highlighting the interconnections between diverse disease
drivers, the global interdependencies inherent to these
exampleswillalsobeevident.Thefollowingexampleshave
been selected to interrogate how different combinations
of drivers have affected recent infectious disease risks.
In ‘Dengue and Chikungunya in Europe: links with glob-
alisation and environmental change’ section, the links
betweenenvironmentalfactors,climatechange,andglobal
tradeandtravelarediscussed.In‘MeaslesamongRomain
Bulgaria and HIVamong PWID in Greece: the impact of
socioeconomic contexts’ section, socioeconomic contexts
andtheimpactofthefinancialcrisisareexaminedfortheir
influence on disease outcomes. ‘Avian influenza: human
animal interfaces and global travel’section examines avian
influenza in the context of humananimal interfaces and
global travel, and ‘The impact of conflicts and population
displacement on attempts to eradicate polio’ section in-
vestigatestheimpactofterrorism,conflict,andpopulation
displacements on infectious disease risk.
Dengue and Chikungunya in Europe: links with
globalisation and environmental change
The sustained transmission of a vector-borne disease
requires the presence of a pathogen, a vector capable of
transmitting that pathogen, and a susceptible human pop-
ulation (36). The interconnections between multiple dis-
ease drivers and interdependencies created by a globalised
world have enabled the global expansion of vector-borne
diseases, of which recent examples include the arboviruses
dengue (70) and Chikungunya (71, 72).
Onecritical factor in theexpansionof thesediseases has
been global trade. The mosquito species Aedes albopictus,
also known as the Asian Tiger mosquito, is a secondary
vector of dengue and Chikungunya and is thought to be
the most invasive mosquito species of public health im-
portance in the world (73). Over the past few decades,
it has expanded from its original habitat in Asia to all
populated continents in the world (74). It has been docu-
mented that this expansion has been enabled by global
trade in used tires (73, 75).
In Europe, the climatic conditions have been permis-
sive enough to enable Ae. albopictus to gradually expand
(often via transportation networks) from its introduc-
tion in Italy, where it arrived in 1990 (76). Today, Ae.
albopictus is established in many regions of the Mediter-
ranean Basin, including in Spain, France, Italy, Croatia,
and Greece. In addition, the mosquito has been intro-
duced to regions as far north as Germany, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia.
4 Models based on the known
climatic determinants of Ae. albopictus suggest that many
more areas of Europe could be suitable habitats for the
mosquito (77) as well as for Chikungunya transmission,
with some regions currently also amenable to dengue
transmission (74). Under climate change scenarios, addi-
tional areas in Central and Western Europe, but fewer
4http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/vectors/vector-maps/
Pages/VBORNET_maps.aspx, data as of October, 2013. Accessed
January 12, 2014.
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(26, 78).
In a deeply interconnected world, there are numerous
opportunities for viruses to be introduced into non-
endemic regions (38). Each year, millions of people fly
between regions of the world endemic to dengue or
Chikungunya and European regions that are now home
to Ae. Albopictus, whose ability to transmit Chikungunya
increased after a single genetic mutation in the Chikun-
gunya virus (79). In 2007, a traveller from India, infected
with Chikungunya, was bitten by mosquitoes in Italy,
leading to a local outbreak in which over 200 people were
infected (80). Dengue, meanwhile, which is now endemic
in many tropical and sub-tropical parts of the world (81),
has also been transmitted by Ae. albopictus in Europe,
as has been documented in France and Croatia (82, 83).
AsaresultofthecontinuingexpansionofAe.albopictus
in Europe, aided by trade and travel networks, climatic
conditions, and genetic evolution, two diseases previously
‘exotic’ to Europe now pose a persistent infectious disease
risk. This sort of risk is clearly not restricted to Europe;
in late 2013, Chikungunya was introduced and then
initially locally transmitted in a few Caribbean islands,
creating a high risk of further disease spread across the
region.
5 By early September, 2014, Chikungunya trans-
mission has been reported in 31 countries and territories
in the Caribbean and the Americas, with over 700,000
suspected cases and over 8,600 confirmed autochthonous
cases.
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Measles among Roma in Bulgaria and HIV among
PWID in Greece: the impact of socioeconomic
contexts
Socioeconomic contexts affect the spread of disease.
When financial circumstances deteriorate, the most vul-
nerable members of society are at even greater risk of
infectious disease. Two examples in this section demon-
strate the links between public health provision, income
disparities, and infectious disease.
Economic progress of the Roma population in Bulgaria
has experienced a number of setbacks, ever since the
political and economic transition of the late 80s (84, 85).
Discrimination, poor educational attainment, lack of oc-
cupational training, poor access to labour markets, and
geographic isolation have all contributed to high un-
employment rates (86). The lack of job opportunities
discourages further training and education, thereby perpe-
tuating a vicious circle of poor education, poor working
opportunities, and worsening living conditions (85). For
example, Roma are five times more likely to feel their
health is threatened due to the unhygienic conditions in
which they live than is the Bulgarian majority population
(87). These circumstances, connected to broader cultural,
demographic, and economic risks, have precipitated one
of the worst measles outbreaks in Europe of the past
decades. Over 24,000 individuals fell ill and 24 died over a
time period of a few months, starting in April 2009 (88).
Approximately 90% of the cases were from the Bulgarian
Roma community despite the fact that only 4% of the
general Bulgarian population are Roma. In this outbreak,
the risk for developing severe medical complications such
as pneumonia or encephalitis from a measles infection
was linked to lower maternal education levels, lower child
immunisation coverage, and the absence of household
incomes (86). Despite Bulgarian children being eligible
for free basic medical services, almost 95% of cases had
not received the full course of measlesmumpsrubella
(MMR) vaccination.
Although the root causes of measles outbreak are
multifactorial, it is noteworthy that Bulgaria had one
of the lowest rates of total governmental spending over
gross domestic product in 2009 of the EU (37% vs. 49%,
respectively) (89). Roma communities remain susceptible
to communicable diseases such as the measles outbreak in
2009; outbreaks of hepatitis A, tuberculosis, and polio-
myelitis have also disproportionally affected the Roma
ethnic group (90, 91).
Another highly vulnerable group for infectious diseases
in Europe are PWID. In the wake of the global economic
crisis, many health professionals across Europe antici-
pated adverse effects in relation to infectious disease in-
cidence and control (92). An observed rapid increase
in reported HIV cases among PWID in both Greece and
Romania was thought to be linked to the economic
crisis (48). In Greece, for example, HIV incidence among
PWID increased by 1600% in 2011 (47). From an epi-
demiologic standpoint, it is difficult to causally link the
economic crisis with an upsurge in HIV in a particular
subpopulation. Nonetheless, there are potential causal
factors worth noticing. Yearly change in the Greek
GDP has been found to be inversely associated with
HIV case reports, homelessness, unemployment among
PWID, and HIV prevalence among drug injectors seeking
drug treatment in Athens (47). Meanwhile, causal path-
ways have been hypothesised to include the following
factors: the economic recession increased income dispa-
rities, leading to increased homelessness; this contributed
to increased injecting network sizes among PWID, which
were then exposed to new introductions of HIV from
migrant communities, themselves subject to difficult
socioeconomic circumstances in their home countries
(47). Transmission risk was intensified by low levels of
available injecting equipment and other prevention ser-
vices (47). Although difficult to demonstrate the causal
linkages, this scenario suggests that the economic crisis,
5http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/press/news/_layouts/forms/News_DispForm.
aspx?List8db7286c-fe2d-476c-9133-18ff4cb1b568&ID940&Root
Folder/en/press/news, accessed January 12, 2014.
6http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?optioncom_topics&view
article&id343&Itemid40931, accessed September 13, 2014.
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tributed to a large upswing of HIV in a vulnerable
population, making conditions among PWID even more
tenuous and, simultaneously, leading to fewer resources
dedicated to harm prevention.
Avian influenza: humananimal interfaces
and global travel
Specific subtypes of influenza A viruses that circulate
in birds can infect humans. Influenza infections of avian
origin occur through both direct and indirect exposure
to infected animals, whether alive or dead. One impor-
tant unique feature of influenza viruses is their ability to
cause both annual epidemics (seasonal influenza) and,
from time to time, more serious pandemics (93). Each
emerging strain has the potential to become seasonal.
Birds are a natural reservoir for influenza viruses, and
Avirus subtypes H5, H7 and H9 have all led to outbreaks
in human populations (94). In recent years, the most sig-
nificant outbreaks have been related to H5N1 and H7N9.
Although a limited number of human cases infected with
influenza A(H5N1) has been reported, the high case fa-
talityanditspotentialabilitytoadapttohumanhostshave
raisedconcernatthegloballevel(95).Morerecently,inthe
spring of 2013, 145 people in China were infected by the
avian influenza strain A(H7N9), leading to 45 deaths (96).
The virus was detected in poultry but also in the environ-
ment. The closure of live poultry markets in April 2013
did lead to a dramatic drop in the number of cases (97)
although sporadic cases have been reported through the
end of 2013.
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A broad combination of factors can trigger and some-
times amplify avian influenza outbreaks (98, 99). Ecologi-
cal and environmental factors play a key role. Population
density of both human and animals  as well as the pro-
ximity between them  are known risk factors for avian
influenza infections in humans. Live bird markets and
human consumption patterns of poultry and other avian
species are also known to contribute to the risk of both
influenza emergence aswell as infection (100). Seasonality
is another influencing factor, although different hypoth-
eses exist as to why winter seasons are traditionally driv-
ing influenza transmission (101). Bird migratory patterns,
particularly where migratory birds might interact with
livestock poultry, create potential pathways for introduc-
tion of the virus into new regions. Air travel can quickly
leadtotherapidglobalspreadofinfluenza(3).Meanwhile,
the level of available public health measures, from mole-
cular surveillance to rapid vaccine production, are impor-
tant determinants of the impact that any given influenza
outbreak might have (102). Significantly, different avian
influenza strains have different characteristics, further
challenging the public health response. For example,
influenza A(H5N1) is highly pathogenic in birds, leading
to natural sentinel surveillance systems, while influenza
A(H7N) may circulate among healthy birds, thereby
remaining undetected (103).
The global and sectoral interdependencies related to
influenza have been well documented. A widespread
pandemic could quickly disrupt activities in many sectors,
including trade (including potential trade bans) (104),
transportation, healthcare delivery, critical infrastruc-
ture, and so on. School closures and workplace absentee-
ism are oft-cited control measures that might also have
substantial impact on society. Numerous economic es-
timates indicate that the direct costs (use of healthcare
services) and indirect costs (productivity losses) related
to seasonal influenza can amount to billions of dollars
globally (105). An economic scenario analysis of pan-
demic influenza in the United Kingdom indicated po-
tential costs of 0.51% of GDP in low fatality scenario
and 3.34.3% in a high fatality scenario (106).
The impact of conflicts and population displacement
on attempts to eradicate polio
Political unrest, armed conflict, and related population
displacements are well known to be severe barriers to the
provision of public health programmes (including immu-
nisation programmes). Needless to say, conflicts also lead
to significant vulnerabilities among populations, whilst
population movements create further opportunities for
disease spread.
Complex security situations have played a role in
slowing down global efforts at polio eradication. In
Pakistan, two workers associated with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and its polio vaccination cam-
paign were shot dead in July, 2012 (107), and it has since
been reported that 31 people associated with polio cam-
paigns were killed in the country between July 2012 and
December 2013; reportedly, polio workers have been
targeted for killing with terrorist intentions.
8 Vaccination
campaigns in Pakistan have been further hindered by
public mistrust (107), a situation that likely further de-
teriorated after it was revealed that one doctor had run a
fake vaccination campaign as part of a collaboration with
the US Central Intelligence Agency efforts to find Osama
7http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/press/news/_layouts/forms/News_DispForm.
aspx?List8db7286c%2Dfe2d%2D476c%2D9133%2D18ff4cb1b568
&ID930&RootFolder%2Fen%2Fpress%2Fnews%2FLists%2FNews
&Sourcehttp%3A%2F%2Fecdc%2Eeuropa%2Eeu%2Fen%2Fhealth
topics%2Favian%5Finfluenza%2FPages%2Findex%2Easpx&Web
86661a14%2Dfb61%2D43e0%2D9663%2D0d514841605d, accessed
January 10, 2014.
8http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/pakistan-polio-
workers-targeted-killing-201312118364851379.html, accessed January
14, 2014.
9http://www.polioeradication.org/Dataandmonitoring/Poliothisweek.
aspx, accessed January 14, 2014.
10http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/polio.pdf,
accessed September 13, 2014.
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cases in 2013, up from 55 in 2012.
9 Assuming that roughly
95% of polio infections are asymptomatic and another
4.5% have mild or non-paralytic symptoms,
10 this means
that at least a few thousand additional people could be
currently carrying and transmitting the virus in the
country. Meanwhile, polio eradication programmes have
pushed back their target completion dates, and it is has
been reported that 350,000 children in Pakistan’s Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas have not received polio
vaccinations since mid-2012.
11
Spill-over into neighbouring countries is one conse-
quence of halted polio eradication. It appears that an
introduction of polio from Pakistan into the broader
region led to viral circulation in Israel, Egypt and, po-
tentially, Syria (110). In Israel, circulation of the polio-
virus occurred despite an estimated vaccination coverage
of greater than 95% of the general population (110, 111).
In Syria, 17 laboratory-confirmed cases were identified in
2013, implying widespread circulation of poliovirus (111).
The combination of conflict and circulating polio-
virus is potentially highly problematic, as there are cur-
rently more than two million Syrian refugees globally,
with an increase of 700,000 since July 2013 (111). This
vast number, with high numbers of children, many of
whom may be unvaccinated, creates the potential for
further regional spread of poliovirus. In a globalised
world, this risk is not localised. In the EU, 10% of new
asylum applications between January 1 and August 2013
were from Syria, while the number of undocumented
migrants from Syria has also increased (111). Such
circumstances increase the risk of poliovirus reintroduc-
tion and transmission.
The risk of further global spread of wild poliovirus
was recently acknowledged by WHO when it declared a
Public Health Emergency of International Concern in
May 2014.
12 As of summer 2014, there are four countries
exporting polio: Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Pakistan,
and Syria. There are additionally six polio-affected
countries: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel, Nigeria,
and Somalia.
13 As WHO noted:
The consequences of further international spread
are particularly acute today given the large number
of polio-free but conflict-torn and fragile States
which have severely compromised routine immuni-
zation services and are at high risk of re-infection.
14
Complicating the matter even further is the fact that
alongside broader political issues that affect the possibi-
lity of implementing vaccination programmes, personal
beliefs about the safety and benefits of vaccines are mod-
ulated by social ties, religious beliefs, and familial values.
All of these factors affect vaccination uptake rates, as
recent studies in both Pakistan and Nigeria have shown
(112, 113).
There are many tragic dimensions to humanitarian
crises and conflict-ridden regions, which aside from nu-
merous other challenges must also deal with potentially
explosive infectious disease outbreaks. This example de-
monstrates that inadequate global coordination of the
health response (114), in combination with the intercon-
nection of key risks such as low vaccination coverage
(50, 115), conflict and terrorism, and population displace-
ment, have the potential to amplify an already serious risk
to global health.
Analysing interconnected and interdependent
infectious disease risks
There is a growing awareness within the health sector that
the wide range of factors  many of them risks generated
from other sectors  that can combine to affect the trans-
mission of infectious disease need to be better and more
holistically monitored, assessed, and acted upon. This is
reflected bycalls toapproach thetopic from abroadersys-
tems perspective (7, 33, 116119), which tends to empha-
sise the need for integrating insights from multiple sectors
anddisciplines.Similarly,theOneHealthapproach,which
recognises the intimate relationship between environ-
mental conditions, animal health, and human health,
has been promoted at the global level
15; ways of oper-
ationalising One Health concepts have also gained trac-
tion (120). Growing attention to the social determinants
of health, meanwhile, is another crucial development
for assessing and monitoring infectious-disease-related
risks.
In concert with the growing awareness of the need
to broadly assess the interconnected nature of infectious
disease risk, there have been growing calls to develop tools
and methodologies for predictive modelling of infectious
disease outbreaks that assess, to some degree, the am-
plifying role that non-health factors play in propagat-
ing disease risk (17, 121, 122). Lagging behind have
been analyses of vulnerabilities as well as strong evidence
bases on the status and efficacy of public health prepared-
ness (123)  two critical determinants of the magnitude
of impact that any disease outbreaks might have.
There are a wide range of approaches to predic-
tive infectious disease modelling (122). One of the more
promising developments has been research into the links
11http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p1121-polio-progress.html,
accessed January 14, 2014.
12http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/polio-20140505/
en/, accessed July 16, 2014.
13http://www.polioeradication.org/Infectedcountries/PolioEmergency.
aspx, accessed July 16, 2014.
14http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/polio-20140505/
en/, accessed July 16, 2014.
15http://www.oie.int/en/for-the-media/editorials/detail/article/one-world-
one-health/, accessed January 14, 2014.
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spread. As discussed in the ‘Infectious disease drivers
and interconnected risk’ section, many environmental
drivers can be considered as epidemic precursors of
disease, and thus monitoring changes in environmental
conditions can help anticipate or even forecast anupsurge
of disease (121). In recent years, work in this area has been
greatly enabled by rapid developments in Geographic
Information Systems, which have facilitated the manage-
ment and use of spatial data for analytic epidemio-
logy. Climatic, weather, and environmental data can now
be linked and integrated with data on health, disease
vectors, and so on, to provide support tools for decision
makers (121).
To illustrate how this has can be done, the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control developed the
European Environment and Epidemiology (E3) Network
to help monitor environmental conditions related to
infectious disease threats (121). The initial building-block
ofthe E3Networkis datafrom the Emerging Diseases in a
Changing European Environment project (EDEN), a
research initiative funding by the Directorate-General for
Research and Innovation of the European Commission.
16
The aggregation of these data sets, and those continuously
acquired from other sources, with regular outputs from
advanced scientific analysis, serve as a starting point for
analysis of disease risk and vulnerable regions.
This approach has been used to predict the environ-
mental suitability of malaria transmission in Greece
(124). Malaria was eradicated from Greece in 1974, but
in 2009 (and subsequent years), locally acquired cases
were identified. Remotely sensed data were used to des-
cribe the environmental and climatic conditions where
future transmission could happen in Greece. Sea-level al-
titude and the mean and annual variation of land-surface
temperature, both for daytime and night-time, were pre-
dictors in this model. Defining the areas of high risk
helped guide the public health responses and to integrate
preparedness and response activities, including targeted
epidemiological and entomological surveillance, vector
control activities, and awareness rising among the general
population and health workers, in the areas environmen-
tally suitable for transmission.
In another example, the E3 Network hosts a real-time
model for the environmental suitability of Vibrio spp.i n
marine waters worldwide, taking into account tempera-
ture and salinity (125). It uses daily-updated remotely
sensed data to assess environmental suitability conditions
for Vibrio spp. infections according to a model developed
by Baker-Austin et al. (126). Infections caused by Vibrio
species (other than V. cholerae) can cause serious pro-
blems for immunocompromised persons, although the
overall occurrence is generally low. Nonetheless, early
information about the environmental suitability of Vibrio
spp. infections will be of public health interest, and also
demonstrates a proof-of-concept for predictive disease
modelling more generally.
Linking data from other relevant fields is currently at
a very early stage of development. Incorporating human
behaviour into infectious disease modelling has thus
far remained an understudied area (127). There are,
however, recent promising approaches that involve tap-
ping into mainstream and social media so as to measure
and monitor issues such as vaccine hesitancy (128). The
emerging field of digital epidemiology seeks to leverage
the vast amount of digital information that exists and
combine data relevant to both the transmission of dis-
ease as well as health behaviours (129). This field offers
enormous promise but also needs to make progress in
resolving questions surrounding methodologies, data
quality and availability, and the privacy of online data.
Conclusion
As has been stressed in this paper, infectious diseases are
very often the product of a wide range of interacting and
interconnected factors, and disease outbreaks create
many cross-sectoral interdependencies. There is an emer-
ging body of research on deploying a systems perspective
of the many factors affecting infectious disease risks,
and there are now even early stage predictive modelling
frameworks that show promise. Information from these
analyses can be used to set public health priorities and
to inform civil society about potential consequences that
factors external to health, such as global change, have on
infectious disease control.
Moving forward, more research into the efficacy and
status of public health preparedness and further work
on the cross-sectoral dependencies created by disease
outbreaks will be important areas for development.
Meanwhile, methodological development of approaches
for analysing priorities for public health preparedness
activities and tools for facilitating cross-sectoral colla-
boration were recently highlighted by participants repre-
senting more than 30 countries at a Joint ECDC-WHO
Consultation on Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness,
held in November, 2013.
17 These will be developed by
ECDC in the coming years.
At the European policy level, the multifactorial,
interconnected, and interdependent nature of infectious
disease risks has been recognised. On 6 November 2013,
a new EU Decision on serious cross-border threats to
health entered into force.
18 Two of the main features
17http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/Joint-
ECDC-WHO-Europe-Consultation-on-pandemic-and-all-hazard-
preparedness-meeting-report.pdf, accessed July 14, 2014.
18http://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/policy/decision/
index_en.htm, accessed January 14, 2014.
16http://www.eden-fp6project.net/, accessed January 14, 2014.
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its emphasis on inter-sectoral collaboration. Both as-
pects are of strong relevance for an integrated approach
towards interconnected risks.
The all-hazard component implies a shift from a cause-
driven to an impact-driven assessment and management
of health threats. In this sense, the Decision builds on
the EU’s extensive experience in the field of communi-
cable diseases and expands it to other types of threats of
biological, chemical, or environmental origin, ensuring
a consistent European response across countries and
across types of public health emergencies. The inter-
sectoral component aims at enhancing the joint prepared-
ness and response planning among European countries,
resulting in comprehensive assessments of emergency sit-
uations and a formulation of responses addressing the
whole range of their potential impacts. This Decision
thus draws attention to the need for integrated approaches
towards the identification, assessment and management
of interconnected risks.
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